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Abstract
We study variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the men or the women, or both, are
derived from a master preference list. This models real-world matching problems in which participants are ranked according to
some objective criteria. The master list(s) may be strictly ordered, or may include ties, and the lists of individuals may involve
ties and may include all, or just some, of the members of the opposite sex. In fact, ties are almost inevitable in the master list if
the ranking is done on the basis of a scoring scheme with a relatively small range of distinct values. We show that many of the
interesting variants of stable marriage that are NP-hard remain so under very severe restrictions involving the presence of master
lists, but a number of special cases can be solved in polynomial time. Under this master list model, versions of the stable marriage
problem that are already solvable in polynomial time typically yield to faster and/or simpler algorithms, giving rise to simple new
structural characterisations of the solutions in these cases.
c© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction and background
The classical stable marriage problem. The Stable Marriage problem (SM) was introduced in the seminal paper of
Gale and Shapley [3]. In its classical form, an instance of SM involves n men and n women, each of whom specifies
a preference list, which is a total order on the members of the opposite sex. A matching M is a set of (man, woman)
pairs such that each person belongs to exactly one pair. If (m, w) ∈ M , we say that w is m’s partner in M , and vice
versa, and we write M(m) = w, M(w) = m.
We say that a person x prefers y to y′ if y precedes y′ on x’s preference list. A matching M is stable if it admits no
blocking pair, namely a pair (m, w) such that m prefers w to M(m) and w prefers m to M(w). Gale and Shapley [3]
proved that every instance of SM admits a stable matching, and described an algorithm – the Gale–Shapley algorithm
– that finds such a matching in time that is linear in the input size. In general, there may be many stable matchings (in
fact exponentially many in n) for a given instance of SM [13].
Extensions of the classical problem. A variety of extensions of the basic problem have been studied. In the Stable
Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI), the numbers of men and women need not be the same, and each person
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p’s preference list consists of a subset of the members of the opposite sex (the acceptable persons for p) in strict order.
A pair (m, w) is acceptable if each member of the pair is acceptable to the other. We let a denote the total number of
acceptable pairs. A matching M is now a set of acceptable pairs such that each person belongs to at most one pair. In
this context, (m, w) is a blocking pair for a matching M if (a) (m, w) is an acceptable pair, (b) m is either unmatched
or prefers w to M(m), and likewise (c) w is either unmatched or prefers m to M(w). As in the classical case, there
is always at least one stable matching for an instance of SMI, and it is straightforward to extend the Gale–Shapley
algorithm to this case. Again, there may be many different stable matchings, but Gale and Sotomayor [4] showed that
every stable matching for a given SMI instance has the same size and matches exactly the same set of people. We
remark that, from the point of view of finding a stable matching, we lose no generality in assuming that, given an
instance of SMI, the preference lists are consistent (i.e., for any two persons p and q, p is acceptable to q if and only
if q is acceptable to p).
The Gale–Shapley algorithm for SM or SMI can be man-oriented or woman-oriented, i.e., applied from either the
men’s or the women’s ‘side’. In the former case, it yields a stable matching – the man-optimal – that is simultaneously
the best possible stable matching for all of the men and the worst possible for all of the women. The roles of the sexes
may be reversed to give the woman-optimal stable matching. Some alternative, perhaps fairer, optimality criteria have
been proposed. For example, a minimum regret stable matching is one for which max r(p,M(p)) (defined as the
regret of M) is minimised, where the maximum is taken over all persons p, and r(x, y) represents the rank of y in
the preference list of x . An egalitarian stable matching is one for which
∑
r(p,M(p)) (defined as the weight of M)
is minimised, where the sum is taken over all persons p. Finally, a lexicographic maximum stable matching is one in
which the maximum number of people obtain their first-choice partner, and subject to this condition, the maximum
number obtain their second-choice partner, and so on. More precisely, for a matching M define ri (M) to be the number
of people for whom r(p,M(p)) = i . Then the requirement is a stable matching M for which the vector (r1, . . . , rn)
is lexicographically maximum.
Efficient algorithms have been devised for a number of variants of SM and SMI; for example:
• all of the stable pairs (i.e., the (man, woman) pairs that belong to at least one stable matching) can be identified in
O(a) time [5];
• all of the stable matchings can be found in O(a + nk) time [5], where k is the total number of such matchings;
• a minimum regret stable matching can be found in O(a) time [5];
• an egalitarian stable matching can be found in O(a2) time [14], later improved to O(a3/2) time [2];
• a lexicographic maximum stable matching can be found in O(n1/2a3/2) time [2].
An alternative extension of SM arises if preference lists are allowed to contain ties. In the Stable Marriage problem
with Ties (SMT) each person’s preference list is a partial order over the members of the opposite sex in which
indifference is transitive. In other words, each person p’s list can be viewed as a sequence of ties, each of length
≥ 1; p prefers each member of a tie to everyone in any subsequent tie, but is indifferent between the members of any
single tie. In this context, three definitions of stability have been proposed [6,11].
A matching M is
• weakly stable if there is no pair (m, w), each of whom prefers the other to his/her partner in M ;
• strongly stable if there is no pair (p, q) such that p prefers q to M(p) and q either prefers p to M(q) or is indifferent
between them (note that p may be either a man or a woman here);
• super-stable if there is no pair (m, w), each of whom either prefers the other to his/her partner in M or is indifferent
between them.
It is immediate from the definitions that
super-stable ⇒ strongly stable ⇒ weakly stable.
For a given instance of SMT, a weakly stable matching is bound to exist, and can be found in O(n2) time by
breaking all ties in an arbitrary way (i.e., by strictly ranking the members of each tie arbitrarily) and applying the
Gale–Shapley algorithm. A super-stable matching may or may not exist, but there is a O(n2) algorithm to find such
a matching or report that there is none [11]. Likewise, a strongly stable matching may or may not exist, but there is
a O(n4) algorithm to find one or report that none exists [11]. An improved O(n3) version of this latter algorithm has
been described recently [18].
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In the context of SMT, some problems involving weakly stable matchings become NP-hard [20] — for example:
• determining whether a given (man, woman) pair is weakly stable;
• finding a minimum regret weakly stable matching;
• finding an egalitarian weakly stable matching.
These results remain true even if the ties occur in the preference lists of one sex only, there is at most one tie per
list, and each tie is of length 2.
Note that, in order that the various forms of optimality for stable matchings are well-defined when ties are present,
we extend the notion of rank, by defining r(x, y) to be one plus the number of strict predecessors of y in x’s preference
list; so, in particular, all entries occurring in the same tie have identical rank.
If we allow both of the above extensions of the classical problem simultaneously, we obtain the Stable Marriage
problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SMTI). The three forms of stability introduced for SMT are again all
meaningful (under the assumption that a person would prefer to be matched to an acceptable partner rather than
to be unmatched). The algorithmic results for strongly stable and super-stable matchings can be extended from SMT
to SMTI [19]. However, the situation for weakly stable matchings turns out to be even more challenging than in SMT.
Once again, it is easy to find a weakly stable matching, merely by breaking all the ties in an arbitrary way and applying
the Gale–Shapley algorithm. However, the ways in which ties are broken will, in general, affect the size of the resulting
matching, and the natural problem of finding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching for an instance of SMTI
turns out to be NP-hard, even under quite severe restrictions on the number and lengths of ties [20]. Specifically, NP-
hardness holds even if ties occur in the preference lists of one sex only, each tie is of length 2, and each tie comprises
the whole of the list in which it appears [20].
The Hospitals/Residents problem. The Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) is a many-to-one generalisation of SMI, so
called because of its application in centralised matching schemes for the allocation of graduating medical students, or
residents, to hospitals [25]. The best known such scheme is the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [22] in
the US, but similar schemes exist in Canada [1], in Scotland [12,27], and in a variety of other countries and contexts.
In fact, this extension of SM was also discussed by Gale and Shapley under the name of the College Admissions
problem [3]. In an instance of HR, each resident has a preference list containing a subset of the hospitals, and each
hospital ranks the residents for which it is acceptable. In addition, each hospital has a quota of available posts. In this
context, a matching is a set of acceptable (resident, hospital) pairs so that each resident appears in at most one pair
and each hospital in a number of pairs that is bounded by its quota. The definition of stability has a natural extension
to this more general setting (see [6] for details). It is again the case that every problem instance admits at least one
stable matching [3], and that all stable matchings have the same size [4]. Clearly SMI is equivalent to the special case
of HR in which each hospital has a quota of 1.
The Hospitals/Residents problem with Ties (HRT) allows arbitrary ties in the preference lists. Since HRT is clearly
an extension of SMTI, the hardness results for weak stability problems in the latter extend to the former. On the
other hand, the polynomial-time algorithms for strongly stable matchings and super-stable matchings in SMTI can be
extended to the analogous variants of HRT [16–18]. These results have potentially important implications for large-
scale real-world matching schemes. It is unreasonable to expect, say, a large hospital to rank in strict order all of its
many applicants, and any artificial strict rankings, whether submitted by the hospitals themselves, or imposed by the
matching scheme administrators, may have significant implications for the number of residents assigned in a stable
matching.
Master lists. In this paper, we focus on special cases of these variants of SM in which the preference lists on one or both
sides may be derived from a single master list, which may or may not contain ties. To be more precise, a master list of
men consists of a single list containing all of the men, which may or may not contain ties; each woman’s preference
list contains her acceptable partners ranked precisely according to the master list. In other words, the preference list
of a woman w is precisely the master list of men, except that each man m that w finds unacceptable is deleted (so in
general, the deletions that give rise tow’s preference list could be made from any part of the master list). An analogous
meaning is attached to a master list of women. Hence, in SM and SMT, the existence of a master list for one sex implies
that all preference lists for the members of the opposite sex are identical, but of course this is not necessarily the case
for SMI and SMTI. It does, however, follow from the construction that the individual preference lists are consistent,
given an instance of SMI or SMTI with master lists.
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The study is motivated by the fact that, in a practical matching scheme, applicants for posts might be ranked,
strictly or with ties, on the basis of some more or less objective criteria, such as academic performance. A particular
instance of this has occurred recently in the context of MTAS (Medical Training Application Service), for allocating
junior doctors to medical posts in the UK. The applicants were assigned a numerical score based on a combination of
their academic record and an evaluation of their completed application forms for the scheme, and a master preference
list, inevitably containing many ties of substantial size, was derived from these scores. Given the numbers of posts
involved (in 2006–07, applicants were competing for 6000 foundation posts and 19,000 specialty posts), MTAS gives
the largest example of a centralised matching scheme involving master preference lists that we are currently aware
of. (For various reasons, not directly associated with the concept of a master list, the whole MTAS system became
the subject of national controversy [8], and has since been largely abandoned in its present form. However it is likely
that its successor, to be used during 2007–08, will also involve a master list of applicants, albeit based on different
criteria.) A case study of a different kind involving master lists is reported by Perach et al. [24]. The authors describe a
method for allocating students to dormitories at the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology. The assignment produced
is a stable matching according to the preferences of students over dormitories; students are ranked using master lists
that refer to socio-economic characteristics as well as academic excellence.
We consider a range of possible variants of SM in which there may be a master list on just one side or on both
sides, and in which the master list(s), and the lists of individuals, may or may not contain ties. For convenience, we
use the extensions -2ML and -1ML to denote problem variants involving master lists on both sides and on one side
respectively; for example, SMTI-2ML represents the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete Lists with a
Master List on both sides — i.e., a master list of men from which the women’s preferences are derived, and a master
list of women from which the men’s preferences are derived. In the case of just one master list, in what follows it will
not usually be necessary to specify whether this list involves men or women, hence the suffix -1ML does not include
this information.
The main results in this paper, and their organisation, are as follows. Section 2 contains an algorithm and a theorem
showing that every instance of SMI-1ML has a unique stable matching that can be found in linear time. The next
three sections cover variants of SMT involving master lists under the weak stability condition. Section 3 deals with
SMTI, and shows that existing hardness results for problems involving finding maximum weakly stable matchings and
weakly stable pairs (i.e, (man, woman) pairs that belong to some weakly stable matching) typically apply even in the
much more restricted case of SMTI-2ML. Section 4 covers the case of SMT-2ML, and shows that the various problems
that arise, such as finding weakly stable pairs, generating weakly stable matchings, and finding optimal (egalitarian,
minimum regret and lexicographic maximum) weakly stable matchings, can typically be solved by simpler and more
efficient algorithms than in the general case. Section 5 deals with SMT-1ML, and proves a number of hardness results
involving finding weakly stable pairs and types of optimal weakly stable matchings. We then switch our attention in
Section 6 to variants of SMT with master lists under the strong and super-stability criteria. We give algorithms that
are simpler, and in the case of strong stability, faster, than those for the general SMTI case, to find a super-stable or a
strongly stable matching or report that none exists. We conclude with a summary, some additional observations, and
some open questions in Section 7.
2. SMI with master lists
Let I be an instance of SMI-1ML (or SMI-2ML). We demonstrate in this section that a greedy algorithm, reminiscent
of, but simpler than, the man-oriented version of the Gale–Shapley algorithm, may be used to find the unique stable
matching in I . Without loss of generality suppose that there is a master list of men, say m1 m2 . . .mn . Consider the
greedy algorithm Greedy-SMI-1ML as described in Fig. 1.
Theorem 2.1. For a given instance of SMI-1ML (or SMI-2ML) there is a unique stable matching, which may be found
in linear time using Algorithm Greedy-SMI-1ML.
Proof. It is immediate that the set of pairs returned by Algorithm Greedy-SMI-1ML is a matching M . To see that M
is stable, suppose that (mi , w) is a blocking pair. Then w must be matched to some m j where j < i , for otherwise
Algorithm Greedy-SMI-1ML would have matched mi to w. But m j precedes mi on the master list of men, giving a
contradiction to the assumed blocking pair.
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Fig. 1. Algorithm Greedy-SMI-1ML.
Fig. 2. SMTI instance with weakly stable matchings of different sizes.
Assume that there is a second stable matching M ′ 6= M , and let i be the smallest index such that M ′(mi ) 6= M(mi ).
Then each of m1, . . . ,mi−1 has the same partner in M ′ as he has in M . Hence, and since Algorithm Greedy-SMI-
1ML gave mi his best available partner, it follows that mi is either unmatched in M ′ or prefersw = M(mi ) to M ′(mi ).
Moreover, w cannot be matched in M ′ with any of m1, . . . ,mi−1, since again, each such man has the same partner in
M ′ as he has in M . Hence w is either unmatched in M ′ or prefers M(w) to M ′(w), so that (mi , w) is a blocking pair
for M ′ – a contradiction.
We finally remark that it is straightforward to verify that Algorithm Greedy-SMI-1ML runs in time linear in the
length of the given preference lists. 
3. SMTI with master lists
3.1. Maximum cardinality weakly stable matchings
In this section we present hardness results for the problem of finding a maximum weakly stable matching, given an
instance of SMTI-2ML. We firstly note that an instance of SMTI-2ML can have weakly stable matchings of different
sizes. For, consider the SMTI instance I shown in Fig. 2, where, as throughout this paper, entries within parentheses
in a given person’s preference list are tied.
Firstly, it is straightforward to verify that w1 w2 is a master list of the women, whilst (m1 m2) is a master list of
the men. Each of the matchings M1 = {(m2, w1)} and M2 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)} is weakly stable in I . Hence, this
observation leads naturally to the problem of finding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching (henceforth a
maximum weakly stable matching), given an instance of SMTI-2ML.
Define MAX SMTI-2ML to be the problem of finding a maximum weakly stable matching, given an instance of
SMTI-2ML, and let MAX SMTI-2ML-D denote the decision version of MAX SMTI-2ML. In this section we show that
MAX SMTI-2ML-D is NP-complete, even under various restrictions involving the positions and lengths of ties in
the master lists, and involving the lengths of individual preference lists. In fact our first two results establish NP-
completeness for the special case of MAX SMTI-2ML-D in which the number of men n is equal to the number of
women, and the target size of weakly stable matching is equal to n. We refer to this restriction as COMPLETE SMTI-
2ML. Given an instance of this problem, we refer to a weakly stable matching of size n as a complete weakly stable
matching.
We firstly show that COMPLETE SMTI-2ML is NP-complete even in the case that there is a single tie in one of the
master lists. To do this, we show that the transformation of Lemma 1 of [20] can have master lists imposed directly.
As in that lemma, we use a reduction from a problem involving matchings in graphs. A matching M in a graph G
is said to be maximal if no proper superset of M is a matching in G. Define MIN MM (respectively EXACT MM) to
be the problem of deciding, given a graph G and integer K , whether G admits a maximal matching of size at most
(respectively exactly) K . MIN MM is NP-complete, even for subdivision graphs [10]. (Given a graph G, the subdivision
graph of G, denoted by S(G), is obtained by subdividing each edge {u, w} of G in order to obtain two edges {u, v}
and {v,w} of S(G), where v is a new vertex.) It turns out that EXACT MM is NP-complete for the same class of
graphs [21].
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We now show how to modify the transformation of Lemma 1 of [20] to show that COMPLETE SMTI-2ML is NP-
complete even if there is a single tie in one of the master lists. For completeness we present the proof of correctness
of the reduction in its entirety.
Theorem 3.1. COMPLETE SMTI-2ML is NP-complete, even if there is only a single tie that occurs in one of the master
lists.
Proof. Clearly COMPLETE SMTI-2ML is in NP. We transform from EXACT MM for subdivision graphs, which is NP-
complete as indicated above. Hence let G (a subdivision graph of some graph) and K (a positive integer) be an instance
of EXACT MM. Then G is a bipartite graph, so that G = (U,W, E), where, without loss of generality, each vertex
in U has degree 2. Further, without loss of generality, we assume that |U | = |W |. For if |U | = |W | + r for some
r > 0, then we may add r vertices a1, . . . , ar to U , and 2r vertices b1, . . . , br , c1, . . . , cr to W , where ai is adjacent
to bi and ci for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ r ). Clearly every vertex in the new set U has degree 2 in the new graph, and G has a
maximal matching of size K if and only if the transformed graph has a maximal matching of size K + r . (A similar
transformation can be carried out if |W | = |U | + r ′ for some r ′ > 0.) Finally, without loss of generality, we may
assume that K ≤ n, where n = |U | = |W |.
Let U = {m1, . . . ,mn} and let W = {w1, . . . , wn}. We construct an instance I of COMPLETE SMTI- 2ML as
follows: letU ∪U ′∪ X be the set of men in I , and letW ∪Y ∪ Z be the set of women in I , whereU ′ = {m′1, . . . ,m′n},
X = {x1, . . . , xn−K }, Y = {y1, . . . , yn} and Z = {z1, . . . , zn−K }. For each vertex mi ∈ U , let w ji and wki be the
two vertices adjacent to mi in G, where ji < ki . For each woman w j ∈ W , let U j = {mi : {mi , w j } ∈ E}, and let
U ′j = {m′i : {mi , w j } ∈ E ∧ j = ki }. The preference lists of the people in I are as follows:
mi : yi w ji wki z1 z2 . . . zn−K (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
m′i : yi wki (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
xi : w1 w2 . . . wn (1 ≤ i ≤ n − K )
w j : (U j ∪U ′j ) x1 x2 . . . xn−K (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
y j : (m j m′j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
z j : (m1 m2 . . .mn) (1 ≤ j ≤ n − K ).
It is straightforward to verify that
(m1 m2 . . . mn m
′
1 m
′
2 . . . m
′
n) x1 x2 . . . xn−K
is a master list of the men in I , and
y1 y2 . . . yn w1 w2 . . . wn z1 z2 . . . zn−K
is a master list of the women in I . Clearly there is a single tie in the master list of men, whilst the master list of women
is strictly ordered. We claim that G has a maximal matching of size K if and only if I has a complete weakly stable
matching.
For, suppose that G has a maximal matching M , where |M | = K . We construct a matching M ′ in I as follows. For
each edge {mi , w j } in M , if j = ji , then we add (mi , w ji ) and (m′i , yi ) to M ′. If j = ki , then we add (m′i , wki ) and
(mi , yi ) to M ′. There remain 2(n − K ) men of the form m pi ,m′pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n − K ) who are as yet unmatched. Add
(m pi , zi ) and (m
′
pi , ypi ) to M
′ (1 ≤ i ≤ n−K ). Similarly there remain n−K women of the formwqi (1 ≤ i ≤ n−K )
who are as yet unmatched. Add (xi , wqi ) to M
′ (1 ≤ i ≤ n − K ). Clearly every man and woman in I is matched in
M ′.
It is straightforward to verify that no woman in Y ∪ Z can be involved in a blocking pair of M ′, and hence neither
can a man in U ′. No man in X can be involved in a blocking pair, since the women in W are matched in M ′ to men in
X in increasing indicial order. Finally, suppose that (mi , w j ) is a blocking pair of M ′, where mi ∈ U and w j ∈ W .
Then (mi , zk) ∈ M ′ for some zk ∈ Z , and (xl , w j ) ∈ M ′ for some xl ∈ X . Thus no edge of M is incident to mi or w j
in G. Hence M ∪ {{mi , w j }} is a matching in G, contradicting the maximality of M . Thus M ′ is a complete weakly
stable matching in I .
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a complete weakly stable matching in I . For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), exactly one of
mi , m′i is matched in M ′ to yi , for otherwise yi is unmatched in M ′, a contradiction. Hence at most one of mi , m′i is
matched in M ′ to a woman in W . It follows that
M = {{mi , w j } ∈ E : (mi , w j ) ∈ M ′ ∨ (m′i , w j ) ∈ M ′}
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is a matching in G. There are exactly n − K men mri (1 ≤ i ≤ n − K ) who have a partner from Z in M ′. Since
M ′(m′ri ) = yri (1 ≤ i ≤ n − K ) by the above remark, it follows that |M | = K .
To complete the proof, it remains to show that M is maximal. For, suppose not. Then there is some edge {mi , w j }
in G such that no edge of M is incident to either mi or w j . Thus (mi , zk) ∈ M ′ for some zk ∈ Z , and (xl , w j ) ∈ M ′
for some xl ∈ X . But then (mi , w j ) is a blocking pair of M ′, a contradiction. Hence M is maximal in G. 
The proof of Theorem 3.1 shows that the problem of finding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching for an
instance of SMTI is NP-hard, even if there is a master list on both sides, one of the master lists is strictly ordered, and
the other has a single tie at its head.
It is interesting to observe that the situation is quite different if the tie is at the tail of the list. In fact, if there is such
a master list on one side, and on the other side all preferences are strict (with or without a master list), we can find a
maximum cardinality weakly stable matching in polynomial time. Suppose that the master list is of men. Process the
men, in order, from the strictly ranked part of the master list, matching each man in turn with his favourite unmatched
woman (if any). It is easy to see that all the pairs formed in this way must belong to every weakly stable matching.
On reaching the master list tie, form a maximum cardinality matching of the men contained in it with unmatched
acceptable partners, and adjoin these new pairs to those formed previously to obtain a maximum cardinality weakly
stable matching.
This is a case where a master list makes the problem easier. The variant of SMTI (without master lists) in which all
the ties are on one side and at the ends of the preference lists is known to be NP-hard [20], though a 5/3-approximation
algorithm for this variant has recently been described [15].
Let I be the instance of SMTI as created by the proof of Theorem 3.1. We note that the proof is unchanged if
the men in X are tied in the master list (and consequently in the preference list of each w j ∈ W ). Therefore in this
modified instance, each woman has either one or two ties in her preference list. Moreover, if S1 is the set of men who
collectively occupy the first tie in the women’s lists (or the only tie, in the case that there is just one), and S2 is the
set of men who occupy the second tie in the lists of the women who have two ties, then it follows that S1 = U ∪ U ′,
S2 = X , and consequently S1 ∩ S2 = ∅. We use this restriction for the transformation in the next theorem, which
demonstrates the NP-completeness of COMPLETE SMTI-2ML for another restricted case. The transformation itself is
similar to that of Theorem 2 in [20].
Theorem 3.2. COMPLETE SMTI-2ML is NP-complete, even if the ties occur in one master list only and are of length 2.
Proof. As in Theorem 3.1, COMPLETE SMTI-2ML is in NP. We transform from the version of COMPLETE SMTI-2ML
as described in the paragraph preceding this theorem. Let I be an instance of this problem, where U = {m1, . . . ,mn}
is the set of men and W = {w1, . . . , wn} is the set of women. Without loss of generality let w1w2 . . .wn be the master
list of women. Recall that every woman has one or two ties in her list. For each woman w j ∈ W , let U hj denote
the set of men who appear in the first tie in w j ’s list (or the only tie, in the case that there is just one), and let U tj
denote the set of men who appear in the second tie in w j ’s list (U tj = ∅ in the case that there is no such tie). Let
U hj = {mk j,1 , . . . ,mk j,h j } for some h j > 0, and let U tj = {ml j,1 , . . . ,ml j,t j } for some t j ≥ 0. We form an instance I ′
of COMPLETE SMTI-2ML as follows: let U ∪ X ∪ Z be the set of men in I ′, and let⋃nj=1 W j ∪Y be the set of women
in I ′, where X =⋃ni=1 X i , Y =⋃nj=1 Y j and Z =⋃ni=1 Zi , and
W j = {w j,r : 1 ≤ r ≤ h j + t j } (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
X i = {xi,r : 1 ≤ r ≤ hi + ti } (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
Y j = {y j,r : 1 ≤ r ≤ h j + t j } (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
Zi = {zi,r : 1 ≤ r ≤ hi + ti − 1} (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Finally let W tj =
⋃h j+t j
r=h j+1{w j,r }. The preference lists in I ′ are formed as follows: each man mi ∈ U starts with his
preference list from I . Let w j ∈ W be an arbitrary woman on mi ’s list in I . If mi ∈ U hj then mi = mk j,a for some
a(1 ≤ a ≤ h j ), while if mi ∈ U tj then mi = ml j,b for some b(1 ≤ b ≤ t j ). In the former case we replace w j by the
women in W tj ∪ {w j,a} in increasing order of the second subscript, while in the latter case we replace w j by w j,b+h j .
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The remaining preference lists are as follows:
xi,r : (wi,r yi,r ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) (1 ≤ r ≤ hi + ti )
zi,r : yi,1 yi,2 . . . yi,h j+t j (1 ≤ i ≤ n) (1 ≤ r ≤ hi + ti − 1)
w j,r : x j,r mk j,r (1 ≤ j ≤ n) (1 ≤ r ≤ h j )
w j,r+h j : x j,r+h j mk j,1 mk j,2 . . . mk j,h j ml j,r (1 ≤ j ≤ n) (1 ≤ r ≤ t j )
y j,r : x j,r z j,1 z j,2 . . . z j,h j+t j−1 (1 ≤ j ≤ n) (1 ≤ r ≤ h j + t j ).
Assume that
⋃n
j=1U hj = {ma1 ,ma2 , . . . ,mac } and
⋃n
j=1U tj = {mb1 ,mb2 , . . . ,mbd }, where a1 < a2 < · · · < ac.
Then ai 6= b j (1 ≤ i ≤ c, 1 ≤ j ≤ d) by the discussion preceding the theorem. Without loss of generality let the men
in U hj be ordered such that if 1 ≤ p < q ≤ h j then k j,p < k j,q . Then it is straightforward to verify that
x1,1 x1,2 . . . x1,h1+t1 x2,1 . . . xn,hn+tn ma1 ma2 . . . mac mb1 mb2 . . . mbd
z1,1 z1,2 . . . z1,h1+t1−1 z2,1 . . . zn,hn+tn−1
is a master list of the men in I ′, and
(w1,1 y1,1) (w1,2 y1,2) . . . (w1,h1+t1 y1,h1+t1) (w2,1 y2,1) . . . (wn,hn+tn yn,hn+tn )
is a master list of the women in I ′. Clearly there are ties in only one master list, they are of length 2, and a tie forms
the whole of the individual list in which it appears. We claim that I has a complete weakly stable matching if and only
if I ′ does.
For, suppose that I has such a matching M . We form a matching M ′ in I ′ as follows. Let (mi , w j ) ∈ M . If
mi ∈ Mhj , then mi = mk j,a for some a (1 ≤ a ≤ h j ). If mi ∈ M tj , then mi = ml j,b for some b (1 ≤ b ≤ t j ); let
a = b + h j . In both cases, add the pairs (mi , w j,a), (x j,r , w j,r ) (1 ≤ r ≤ h j + t j , r 6= a), (x j,a, y j,a), (z j,k, y j,k)
(1 ≤ k ≤ a − 1), and (z j,k−1, y j,k) (a + 1 ≤ k ≤ h j + t j ) to M ′. It is clear that M ′ is a complete weakly stable
matching in I ′.
It is straightforward to verify that no man in X can be involved in a blocking pair of M ′ in I ′. Hence, and since the
men in Z are matched to women in Y in increasing order of their second subscript, neither can any person in Y ∪ Z .
Now suppose that (mi , w j,a) blocks M ′ in I ′. Then a > h j and mi ∈ Mhj . Let m p = M ′(w j,a); then m p = ml j,b ,
where b = a − h j . Clearly (mi , w j,a) 6∈ M ′, and also (mi , w j,r ) 6∈ M ′ (for 1 ≤ r ≤ h j + t j , r 6= a), since
(x j,r , w j,r ) ∈ M ′ (for the same r ). Thus M ′(mi ) 6∈ W j , so that in I , mi strictly prefers w j to M(mi ). Also, in I , w j
strictly prefers mi to m p. Hence (mi , w j ) blocks M in I , a contradiction. Thus M ′ is weakly stable in I ′.
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a complete weakly stable matching in I ′. We form a matching M in I as follows.
Let j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) be given. Since |Z j | = h j + t j − 1 and |Y j | = h j + t j , it follows that M ′(y j,a) = x j,a for some a
(1 ≤ a ≤ h j + t j ), and hence M ′(w j,a) = mi , for some mi ∈ U . Since M ′(x j,r ) = w j,r (for 1 ≤ r ≤ h j + t j , r 6= a),
then M ′ ∩ (U ×W j ) = {(mi , w j,a)}. Let mi be the partner of w j in M . Clearly M is a complete matching in I .
Suppose that (mi , w j ) blocks M in I . Let m p = M(w j ). Then in I , w j strictly prefers mi to m p, so that mi ∈ U hj
and m p ∈ U tj . Thus m p = ml j,b for some b(1 ≤ b ≤ t j ), so that M ′(m p) = w j,a , where a = b + h j . Now in
I ′, w j,a strictly prefers mi to m p. Also in I ′, mi strictly prefers w j,a to M ′(mi ) (since M(mi ) 6= w j implies that
M ′(mi ) 6∈ W j ). Thus (mi , w j,a) blocks M ′ in I ′, a contradiction. Hence M is weakly stable in I . 
We now give an inapproximability result. We show it is NP-hard to approximate MAX SMTI-2ML within δ, for
some δ > 1, even if the individual preference lists in the given instance are of constant length and there is only one tie
in each master list. The transformation is similar to that of Theorem 6 of [7].
Theorem 3.3. It is NP-hard to approximate MAX SMTI-2ML within δ, for some δ > 1. The result holds even if the
individual preference lists in the given instance are of constant length and there is only one tie in each master list.
Proof. By [7, Theorem 1], it is NP-hard to approximate MIN MM for subdivision graphs of cubic graphs within δ0, for
some δ0 > 1. Let G be an instance of this problem. Then G is the subdivision graph of some cubic graph, and hence
G = (U,W, E) is a bipartite graph where without loss of generality each vertex in U has degree 3 and each vertex in
W has degree 2. Let U = {m1, . . . ,ms} and let W = {w1, . . . , wt }. For each vertex mi ∈ U , let Wi denote the three
vertices adjacent to mi in G. Similarly for each vertex w j ∈ W , let U j denote the two vertices adjacent to w j in G.
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We construct an instance I of MAX SMTI-2ML as follows: let U ∪ X be the set of men and let W ∪ Y be the set of
women, where X = {x1, . . . , xt } and Y = {y1, . . . , ys}. The preference lists in I are as follows:
mi : (Wi ) yi (1 ≤ i ≤ s) w j : (U j ) x j (1 ≤ j ≤ t)
xi : wi (1 ≤ i ≤ t) y j : m j (1 ≤ j ≤ s).
It is straightforward to verify that
(m1 m2 . . . ms) x1 x2 . . . xt
is a master list of the men, and
(w1 w2 . . . wt ) y1 y2 . . . ys
is a master list of the women in I . Moreover the length of each man’s preference list is at most 4, whilst the length of
each woman’s preference list is at most 3.
Suppose that M is a maximal matching in G such that |M | = β−1 (G), where β−1 (G) denotes the minimum size of a
maximal matching in G. We construct a matching M ′ in I as follows. Initially let M ′ = M . For each manmi ∈ U who
is unmatched in M , add (mi , yi ) to M ′. Similarly for each woman w j ∈ W who is unmatched in M , add (x j , w j ) to
M ′. Clearly M ′ is a matching in I , and |M ′| = |M |+(s−|M |)+(t−|M |) = s+t−|M |. It is straightforward to verify
that the maximality of M in G implies that M ′ is weakly stable in I . Hence s+(I ) ≥ s + t − |M | = s + t − β−1 (G),
where s+(I ) denotes the maximum size of a weakly stable matching in G.
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a weakly stable matching in I , where |M ′| = s+(I ). Let M = M ′ ∩ E . It
is straightforward to verify that the weak stability of M ′ in I implies that M is maximal in G. Also |M ′| ≤
|M | + (t − |M |) + (s − |M |) = s + t − |M |, for every edge in M contributes one (man, woman) pair to M ′,
and in addition, at most (t −|M |)men in X can be matched in M ′, and at most (s−|M |) women in Y can be matched
in M ′. Hence s+(I ) = |M ′| ≤ s + t − |M | ≤ s + t − β−1 (G).
Thus s+(I ) + β−1 (G) = s + t . Now 2t = 3s, as G is the subdivision graph of some cubic graph. Also n = s + t
and m = 2t , where n is the number of men in I and m = |E |.
Theorem 1 of [7] shows that it is NP-hard to distinguish between the cases that β−1 (G) ≤ c0m and β−1 (G) > δ0c0m,
where c0 > 0 is some constant. Hence if β
−
1 (G) ≤ c0m, then s+(I ) ≥ cn, whilst if β−1 (G) > δ0c0m, then
s+(I ) < δcn, where c = 5−6c05 and δ = 5−6δ0c05−6c0 . The result follows by Theorem 1 and Proposition 4 of [7]. 
3.2. Weakly stable pairs in SMTI-2ML
In this section we consider the complexity of the problem of finding all weakly stable pairs, given an instance of
SMTI-2ML. Define WEAKLY STABLE PAIR OF Π to be the problem of deciding, given an instance I of Π and a (man,
woman) pair (m, w), whether (m, w) is a weakly stable pair in I .
Theorem 3.4. WEAKLY STABLE PAIR OF SMTI-2ML is NP-complete, even if there are ties in only one of the master
lists.
Proof. Clearly WEAKLY STABLE PAIR OF SMTI-2ML is in NP. To show that the problem is NP-hard, we transform
from the variant of COMPLETE SMTI-2ML in which ties occur only in the master list of men, which is NP-complete
by Theorem 3.1. Let I be an instance of this problem, where U = {m1, . . . ,mn} and W = {w1, . . . , wn} are the sets
of men and women in I respectively. Let Lm and Lw be the master lists of men and women respectively, and let Pi
and Q j be the preference lists of each mi ∈ U and w j ∈ W respectively. We construct an instance I ′ of WEAKLY
STABLE PAIR OF SMTI-2ML as follows: the set of men in I ′ is {m0} ∪U , and the set of women in I ′ is {w0} ∪W . The
preference lists for each person in I ′ are as follows:
m0 : Lw w0 w0 : Lm m0
mi : Pi w0 (1 ≤ i ≤ n) wi : Qi m0 (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Clearly a master list L ′m of the men in I ′ may be obtained by appending m0 to Lm , whilst a master list L ′w of the
women in I ′ may be obtained by appending w0 to Lw. This gives an instance of SMTI-2ML in which there are no ties
in the master list of women. It is straightforward to check that I admits a complete weakly stable matching if and only
if I ′ has a weakly stable matching containing the pair (m0, w0). 
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4. SMT with master lists on both sides
4.1. Finding all weakly stable pairs
We now show that, in contrast to Theorem 3.4, for an instance I of SMT-2ML, we can find all the weakly stable
pairs in time O(n + s), where n is the number of men and s is the number of weakly stable pairs in I . Let Lm and
Lw be the master lists in I . Henceforth we assume, without loss of generality, that the men are indexed so that mi is
listed before m j in Lm if and only if i < j (note that this includes the possibility that mi and m j are tied in Lm), and
similarly for the women on Lw. We say that a tie T ∈ Lm overlaps a tie T ′ ∈ Lw if and only if there is some i such
that mi ∈ T and wi ∈ T ′, and for every such i we say that mi and wi are in the overlap between T and T ′. If all the
ties in a given preference list are broken in some way, making the list strictly ordered, we say that the list has been
resolved.
Lemma 4.1. Let I be an instance of SMT-2ML. The pair (mi , w j ) is a weakly stable pair in I if and only if T and T ′
overlap, where T and T ′ are the ties in Lm and Lw containing mi and w j respectively.
Proof. Suppose that T and T ′ overlap. Then it is possible to resolve the master lists so that mi and w j occupy the
same position in the (strictly ordered) resolved master lists. We then match the man at position k with the woman at
position k (1 ≤ k ≤ n) in these resolved lists, where n is the size of the instance. It is immediate that this matching is
weakly stable.
Suppose that T and T ′ do not overlap. Let M be a weakly stable matching containing (mi , w j ). Let p and q be
the minimum and maximum indices of men mk appearing in T respectively, and let r and s be the minimum and
maximum indices of women wk appearing in T ′ respectively. Then [p..q] ∩ [r..s] = ∅. Without loss of generality
suppose that p > s. There are p − 1 men on Lm who are strictly preferable to mi on Lm . As p > s, at least one such
man, mx say, is matched in M to a woman who is strictly inferior to w j on Lw. Hence (mx , w j ) is a blocking pair of
M , a contradiction. 
Theorem 4.2. Given an instance I of SMT-2ML we can find all the weakly stable pairs in O(n + s) time, where s is
the number of weakly stable pairs.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, a given pair (mi , w j ) is weakly stable in I if and only if T and T ′ overlap, where T and T ′
are the ties in Lm and Lw containing mi and w j respectively. Consider a tie T in Lm . We can find the weakly stable
partners of each man in T as follows: let fT = min{k : mk ∈ T }, and let lT = max{k : mk ∈ T }. Let X and Y be the
ties in Lw such that w fT ∈ X , and wlT ∈ Y . Let fX = min{k : wk ∈ X}, and let lY = max{k : wk ∈ Y }. Then the
weakly stable partners of the men in T are w fX , . . . , wlY . Finding fT and lT for every tie T takes O(n) overall time,
while finding fX and lY takes O(sT ) time, where sT is the number of weakly stable partners of the men in T . If we
repeat this process for every tie in Lm then it follows that we can find all the weakly stable pairs in O(n + s) time.
4.2. Generation of all weakly stable matchings
We next show that we can find all the weakly stable matchings for an instance I of SMT-2ML, with sublinear time
between the generation of successive matchings.
Let I be an instance of SMT-2ML of size n, and let U = {m1, . . . ,mn} and W = {w1, . . . , wn} be the sets of men
and women respectively in I . By Theorem 4.2, we can list the weakly stable pairs for I in O(n + s) time, where s
is the number of such pairs. We construct a bipartite graph G I , the matching graph, as follows. The set of vertices in
G I is U ∪ W , and there is an edge from mi ∈ U to w j ∈ W if and only if w j is a weakly stable partner of mi . This
construction takes O(n + s) time.
Lemma 4.3. Let I be an instance of SMT-2ML. Then there is a one-to-one correspondence between the weakly stable
matchings for I and the perfect matchings in the matching graph G I .
Proof. Let M = {(m1, wk1), . . . , (mn, wkn )} be a weakly stable matching for I . It is clear that {mi , wki } is an edge in
G I (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and hence M is a perfect matching in G I .
Conversely, let M = {(m1, wk1), . . . , (mn, wkn )} be a perfect matching in G I , and suppose M is not weakly stable.
Let (m, w) be a blocking pair for M . Then w prefers m to M(w), so m is a strict predecessor of M(w) in Lm . Since
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(m,M(m)) ∈ M , the tie in Lm containingm must overlap with that in Lw containing M(m), by Lemma 4.1. Similarly,
m prefers w to M(m), so w is a strict predecessor of M(m) in Lw. Since (M(w),w) ∈ M , the tie in Lw containing w
must overlap with that in Lm containing M(w), by Lemma 4.1. It is clear that not all of these four conditions can be
satisfied simultaneously, and the result follows. 
Uno [28] describes an algorithm which, given an initial perfect matching in a bipartite graph G = (V, E), generates
all k perfect matchings for G in O(k log |V |) time. By Lemma 4.1, the matching produced by breaking the ties in the
two master lists arbitrarily, and then matching the man at position i with the woman at position i , for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
is weakly stable, and can be produced in O(n) time. Then, using Uno’s algorithm, the remaining perfect matchings
in G I can be generated in O(log n) time per matching, giving overall complexity O(n + s + k log n) to generate the
k perfect matchings in G I , which, by Lemma 4.3, are exactly the weakly stable matchings for I . Thus we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.4. Let I be an instance of SMT-2ML of size n. All the weakly stable matchings for I can be generated in
O(n + s + k log n) time, where k is the number of such matchings, and s is the number of weakly stable pairs in I .
4.3. Optimal weakly stable matchings
It turns out that finding the various kinds of optimal weakly stable matchings is straightforward in the case of
SMT-2ML, as the following theorem shows. Henceforth, MINIMUM REGRET Π , EGALITARIAN Π and LEX MAX Π
denote the problems of finding a minimum regret, egalitarian and lexicographic maximum weakly stable matching
respectively, given an instance of Π . The decision version of each problem is obtained by appending “-D”.
Theorem 4.5. MINIMUM REGRET SMT-2ML, EGALITARIAN SMT-2ML and LEX MAX SMT-2ML can all be solved in
O(n) time.
Proof. For every position i in one master list, some person from the other master list must be matched with the person
at that position. It follows that every weakly stable matching for I must have the same regret and the same weight,
and the numbers of people matched to their i th choice is the same in every weakly stable matching, for each value of
i .
If we resolve the master lists arbitrarily, and match the entries at position i in each resolved list, for each i , then we
obtain a weakly stable matching, and this can be found in O(n) time. By the foregoing it is simultaneously a minimum
regret, egalitarian and lexicographic maximum weakly stable matching, and the result follows. 
5. SMT with a master list on one side
In the case of SMT-1ML, it turns out that, in contrast to Section 4, various problems associated with finding weakly
stable matchings become NP-hard.
5.1. Finding all weakly stable pairs
We firstly consider the problem of finding the weakly stable pairs, given an instance of SMT-1ML. We give an
NP-completeness result along the lines of Theorem 3.4.
Theorem 5.1. WEAKLY STABLE PAIR OF SMT-1ML is NP-complete.
Proof. Clearly WEAKLY STABLE PAIR OF SMT-1ML is in NP. To show that the problem is NP-hard, we transform
from COMPLETE SMTI-2ML, which is NP-complete by Theorem 3.1. Let I be an instance of this problem, where
U = {m1, . . . ,mn} and W = {w1, . . . , wn} are the sets of men and women in I respectively. Let Lm denote the
master list of men, and let Pi be the preference list of mi in I (1 ≤ i ≤ n). We construct an instance I ′ of WEAKLY
STABLE PAIR OF SMT- 1 ML as follows: the set of men in I ′ is {m0} ∪U , and the set of women in I ′ is {w0} ∪W . The
preference lists for the men are as follows:
m0 : − − w0
mi : Pi w0 −− (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
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In a given preference list, the symbol – – denotes all remaining people of the opposite sex in arbitrary strict order. We
obtain a master list L ′m of men in I ′ by appending m0 to Lm . It is straightforward to verify that I admits a complete
weakly stable matching if and only if I ′ has a weakly stable matching M ′ containing (m0, w0). 
Since COMPLETE SMTI-2ML is NP-complete even if ties occur only in one master list, the above reduction implies
that WEAKLY STABLE PAIR OF SMT-1ML is NP-complete even if ties occur only in the master list, or if ties occur
only in the lists on the other side.
5.2. Minimum regret weakly stable matchings
We next consider minimum regret weakly stable matchings in SMT-1ML. We show that the problem of finding such
a matching is solvable in linear time for a specific restriction of SMT-1ML, and NP-hard in general.
Theorem 5.2. MINIMUM REGRET SMT-1ML can be solved in O(n2) time if there is no tie at the tail of the master list.
Proof. Every person must be matched in every weakly stable matching. Since there is a unique person p at the end of
the master list, in every weakly stable matching p’s partner must have regret n. Break all the ties arbitrarily and find
a stable matching for the derived instance of SM. This matching must be weakly stable in the initial instance, and can
be found in O(n2) time. 
If there is a tie at the tail of the master list, it turns out that MINIMUM REGRET SMT-1ML is NP-hard, even if there
are no ties on the other side.
Theorem 5.3. MINIMUM REGRET SMT-1ML-D is NP-complete if there is a tie at the tail of the master list, even if
there are no ties in the lists on the other side.
Proof. Clearly MINIMUM REGRET SMT-1ML-D is in NP. To show that the problem is NP-hard, we transform from
the variant of COMPLETE SMTI-2ML in which ties occur only in the master list of men, which is NP-complete by
Theorem 3.1. Let I be an instance of this problem, where U = {m1, . . . ,mn} and W = {w1, . . . , wn} are the sets of
men and women in I respectively, and let Pi be the preference list of mi in I (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let Lm denote the master
list of men. We construct an instance I ′ of MINIMUM REGRET SMT- 1 ML as follows: the set of men in I ′ is U ∪ X
and the set of women in I ′ is W ∪ Y , where X = {x1, . . . , xn+1} and Y = {y1, . . . , yn+1}. The preference lists of the
men are as follows:
mi : Pi y1 y2 . . . yn+1 −− (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
xi : y1 y2 . . . yn+1 −− (1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1)
while the master list of men becomes L ′m : Lm (X). Clearly there are no ties in the men’s lists. It is straightforward
to verify that I admits a complete weakly stable matching if and only if I ′ has a weakly stable matching of regret at
most n + 1. 
5.3. Egalitarian weakly stable matchings
We now consider egalitarian weakly stable matchings. We give an NP-hardness and approximability result for the
problem of finding such a matching, given an instance of SMT-1ML.
Theorem 5.4. EGALITARIAN SMT-1ML-D is NP-complete.
Proof. Clearly EGALITARIAN SMT-1ML-D is in NP. To show that the problem is NP-hard, we transform from
COMPLETE SMTI-2ML, which is NP-complete, even if one master list is strictly ordered, by Theorem 3.1. Let I
be an instance of this problem, where U = {m1, . . . ,mn} and W = {w1, . . . , wn} are the sets of men and women in I
respectively. Let Lm denote the master list of men. Without loss of generality we assume that Lm contains no ties. Let
Pi be the preference list of mi in I (1 ≤ i ≤ n). We construct an instance I ′ of EGALITARIAN SMT-1ML-D as follows:
the set of men in I ′ is U ∪ X and the set of women in I ′ is W ∪ Y , where X = {x1, . . . , xn2} and Y = {y1, . . . , yn2}.
The preference lists of the men are as follows:
mi : Pi y1 y2 . . . yn2 −− (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
xi : yi −− (1 ≤ i ≤ n2)
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while the master list of men becomes:
L ′m : x1 . . . xn2 Lm .
We show that I admits a complete weakly stable matching if and only if I ′ has a weakly stable matching M ′ where
the weight of M ′, w(M ′), is at most K = (n2+n)(n2+n+1)2 + 2n2.
For, suppose that I admits a complete weakly stable matching M . We create a matching M ′ = M ∪ {(xi , yi ) : 1 ≤
i ≤ n2} in I ′. It is straightforward to verify that M ′ is weakly stable in I ′. Each of the n2 men in X contributes 1 to
the weight of M ′, while each of the n men in U contributes at most n to the weight of M ′. Finally, there are n2 + n
women in I ′, so, since there are no ties in L ′m , the women contribute
∑n2+n
i=1 i = (n
2+n)(n2+n+1)
2 to the weight of M
′.
It follows that w(M ′) ≤ K .
Conversely suppose that I ′ admits a weakly stable matching of weight at most K . Suppose for a contradiction
that I does not admit a complete weakly stable matching. Let M ′ be an arbitrary weakly stable matching in I ′. Then
(xi , yi ) ∈ M ′(1 ≤ i ≤ n2). Also there is some man mi ∈ U who is not matched with a woman from Pi . Then mi
contributes at least n2 + 2 to w(M ′). Each of the remaining n2 + n − 1 men contributes at least 1 to w(M ′). Since
L ′m contains no ties, it follows that w(M ′) ≥ (n
2+n)(n2+n+1)
2 + 2n2 + n + 1 > K . Since M ′ is arbitrary, we obtain a
contradiction. Hence I admits a complete weakly stable matching after all. 
The above reduction implies that EGALITARIAN SMT-1ML is NP-complete even if the master list contains no ties. We
also observe that, given an instance I of SMT-1ML, any weakly stable matching M in I satisfies
1
2
n2 + 3
2
n = n + n(n + 1)
2
≤ w(M) ≤ n2 + n(n + 1)
2
= 3
2
n2 + 1
2
n.
This observation leads to the following result.
Theorem 5.5. EGALITARIAN SMT-1ML is approximable within a factor of 3 when the master list is strict.
5.4. Lexicographic maximum weakly stable matchings
Our final result in this section concerns the NP-hardness of computing a lexicographic maximum weakly stable
matching, given an instance of SMT-1ML. Define the following decision problem:
RESTRICTED LEX MAX SMT-1ML-D
Instance: Instance I of SMT-1ML, and in addition, a vector 〈c1, . . . , cn〉, where n is the number of men in I .
Question: Is there a weakly stable matching M in I such that ri (M) ≥ ci , for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)?
We firstly show that RESTRICTED LEX MAX SMT-1ML-D is NP-complete.
Lemma 5.6. RESTRICTED LEX MAX SMT-1ML-D is NP-complete.
Proof. Clearly RESTRICTED LEX MAX SMT-1ML-D is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we transform from EXACT MM
in subdivision graphs, which is NP-complete as discussed in the preamble to Theorem 3.1. Hence let G (a subdivision
graph of some graph) and K (a positive integer) be an instance of EXACT MM. Then G is a bipartite graph, so that
G = (U,W, E), where without loss of generality each vertex in U has degree 2. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we
assume that |U | = |W | = n and that K ≤ n.
Let U = {m1, . . . ,mn} and W = {w1, . . . , wn}. We construct an instance I of RESTRICTED LEX MAX SMT-
1ML-D as follows. Let U ∪ X ∪ {p} be the set of men in I , and let W ∪ Y ∪ {q} be the set of women in I , where
X = {x1, . . . , xn−K } and Y = {y1, . . . , yn−K }. For each mi ∈ U , let Wi denote the two vertices adjacent to mi in G.
The preference lists of the men in I are as follows:
mi : q (Wi ) (Y ) −− (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
xi : (W ) −− (1 ≤ i ≤ n − K )
p : q −−
whilst each woman’s preference list is derived from the following master list of men:
Lm : p (U ) (X).
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Then I has N men and N women, where N = 2n − K + 1. Define the vector 〈c1, . . . , cN 〉 where c1 = n − K + 2,
c2 = n+ K and ci = 0 (3 ≤ i ≤ N ). We claim that G has a maximal matching of size K if and only if I has a weakly
stable matching M ′ such that ri (M ′) ≥ ci (1 ≤ i ≤ N ).
For, suppose that G has a maximal matching M , where |M | = K . We construct a matching M ′ in I as follows.
Firstly let M ′ = M ∪ {(p, q)}. There remain n − K men in U who are as yet unmatched in M ′ — denote these men
by mai (1 ≤ i ≤ n − K ). Add (mai , yi ) to M ′(1 ≤ i ≤ n − K ). Similarly there remain n − K women in W who are
as yet unmatched in M ′ — denote these women by wb j (1 ≤ j ≤ n − K ). Add (x j , wb j ) to M ′ (1 ≤ j ≤ n − K ). It
is straightforward to verify that M ′ is a weakly stable matching in I such that ri (M ′) ≥ ci (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) as required.
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a weakly stable matching in I , where ri (M ′) ≥ ci (1 ≤ i ≤ N ). We firstly observe
that (p, q) ∈ M ′. It follows immediately from the value of c1 that each man in X is matched in M ′ to a woman in W .
Hence exactly K women in W are matched in M ′ to a man in U . Now suppose that (mi , w j ) ∈ M ′ where w j 6∈ Wi .
Then r2(M ′) < K + K + (n − K ) = c2, a contradiction. Let M = M ′ ∩ (U ×W ). Then M is a matching in G such
that |M | = K . Finally the weak stability of M ′ in I implies that M is maximal in G. 
The main result of this section follows immediately from the above result and the observation that, in the
constructed instance I of RESTRICTED LEX MAX SMT-1ML-D, any weakly stable matching M ′ in I satisfies
r1(M ′) ≤ c1.
Theorem 5.7. LEX MAX SMT-1ML is NP-hard.
6. Super-stable and strongly stable matchings in SMTI
In this section we describe efficient algorithms to find a super-stable and a strongly stable matching, whenever
such matchings exist, for an instance of SMTI-1ML. These algorithms apply, in simplified form, to more specialised
variants, such as SMTI-2ML, SMT-1ML and SMT-2ML. We also show that, in this context, if a super-stable matching
exists then it is unique. There may be more than one strongly stable matching, but the set of such matchings can be
clearly identified, and the algorithm that we describe can return any one of these matchings depending on how the
non-determinism within it is resolved. In both cases, the algorithms use a greedy strategy, and are simpler than the
algorithms for the general case [11,19].
6.1. Super-stable matchings
Suppose, without loss of generality, that there is a master list of men. There may or may not be a master list of
women, and there may be ties in the master list(s) and/or in individual preference lists.
The algorithm for a super-stable matching, Algorithm SMTI-ML-Super, appears in Fig. 3. It incorporates a greedy
strategy that processes each tie T in the master list in turn. (Recall that a tie may be of length 1.) The heads of the
current preference lists of the men in T are examined — we refer to the woman (or women) at the head of such a
man’s list as the key woman (or women) for that man. If a man in T has more than one key woman, or if any two
men in T have the same key woman, then, as we will show, no super-stable matching can exist, and the algorithm
returns null. Otherwise each man in T is paired with his key woman, these pairs are added to the potential super-stable
matching, and the women in question are deleted from the lists of all the other men. If the end of the master list is
reached then, as we will show, the matching so constructed is the unique super-stable matching for the instance.
Note that, if the algorithm returns null, say when processing tie T , then for any man lower than T in the master list,
his set of key women is undefined. If a man’s preference list becomes empty during the execution of the algorithm
then the set of key women for that man is empty. In all other cases, the set of key women for a man is well-defined,
and depends only on the problem instance, since the execution of the algorithm is completely deterministic.
We now establish the correctness of Algorithm SMTI-ML-Super. We require a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 6.1. (i) Let woman w be a key woman for man m, and let M be a super-stable matching. Then (m, w) ∈ M.
(ii) If woman w is deleted from man m’s list during Algorithm SMTI-ML-Super then (m, w) cannot be a pair in
any super-stable matching.
(iii) If man m has an empty set of key women then m cannot be matched in any super-stable matching.
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Fig. 3. Algorithm SMTI-ML-Super.
Proof. (i) Suppose that M is a super-stable matching in which m is not matched to w, and that every man preceding
m in the master list is matched to a key woman (necessarily his unique key woman) in every super-stable matching.
We claim that (m, w) must be a blocking pair for M . First of all, m cannot have a partner in M whom he prefers to w;
the fact that w is a key woman for m means that any preferred woman x must have been deleted from m’s list before
the master list tie containing m was processed during the algorithm’s execution, hence x is the (unique) key woman
for some strict predecessor p of m in the master list, and by our assumption p must be matched to x in M . Secondly,
w cannot have a partner in M whom she prefers to m, for, again by our assumption, any such man p is matched in
M to his unique key woman y; moreover y 6= w for otherwise w would have been deleted from m’s list before the
master list tie containing m was processed, a contradiction. This establishes the claim, so there can be no super-stable
matching in which m is not matched to w.
(ii) Suppose thatw is deleted from man m’s list during Algorithm SMTI-ML-Super. Thenw must be a key woman
for some other man p, and by part (i), must be matched to p in any super-stable matching.
(iii) Manm has an empty set of key women only if all women have been deleted from his list, so that the conclusion
follows immediately from part (ii). 
Theorem 6.2. (a) If Algorithm SMTI-ML-Super returns a matching M then M is the unique super-stable matching
for the given instance of SMTI-1ML.
(b) If Algorithm SMTI-ML-Super returns null then there is no super-stable matching for the given instance of
SMTI-1ML.
Proof. (a) Suppose that the algorithm returns matching M , and that the pair (m, w) is a blocking pair of M as a
super-stable matching. Suppose first that m is unmatched in M . Then at the point where the algorithm processes the
master list tie T containing m, m’s preference list must be empty. So w must have been removed from m’s list when
some earlier tie was processed, and as a consequence w must prefer M(w) to m. Now suppose that m prefers w to
M(m). As in the previous case, w must have been removed from m’s list when some earlier tie was processed, so that
w prefers M(w) to m. Finally, if w and M(m) appear in the same tie on m’s list then either the previous case applies
again, or m has at least two key women, a contradiction in either case.
The fact that M is the unique super-stable matching follows at once from Lemma 6.1(i).
(b) First suppose that the algorithm returns null because two men m and p have the same sole key woman w. By
Lemma 6.1, m and p must both be matched to w in any super-stable matching, so there can be no such matching.
Now suppose that the algorithm returns null because some man m has two key women, say w and x . Then, again
by Lemma 6.1(i), m must be matched in M to both w and x , so again there can be no such matching. 
For the complexity analysis, we make the not unreasonable assumption that every man appears in the preference
list of at least one woman, so that the sum a of the lengths of the preference lists is at least n. It is not hard to see
that, implemented with suitable data structures, each deletion can be accomplished in constant time, so that Algorithm
SMTI-ML-Super has complexity O(a).
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Fig. 4. Algorithm SMTI-ML-Strong.
6.2. Strongly stable matchings
The algorithm for a strongly stable matching, Algorithm SMTI-ML-Strong, appears in Fig. 4. Again it is based
on a greedy strategy that processes each tie T in the master list in turn. The concept of key women is defined as
before. However this time, the existence of a strongly stable matching implies a weaker necessary condition on the
sets of key women, namely that their union is equal in size to the set of men in T , and that they have a set of distinct
representatives (SDR). If this is not the case, then the algorithm returns null, and as we will show, there cannot be
a strongly stable matching. Otherwise, each of the men in T is matched with a different key woman, these pairs are
added to the potential strongly stable matching, and the women in question are deleted from the lists of all other
men. If the end of the master list is reached, then as we will show, the matching so constructed is a strongly stable
matching, and all such matchings can be obtained by an execution of this algorithm (with suitable choices of SDRs at
each stage).
We now establish the correctness of Algorithm SMTI-ML-Strong. We require a preliminary lemma whose
statement and proof are analogous to those of Lemma 6.1.
Lemma 6.3. (i) Let w1, . . . , wr be the set of key women for man m, and let M be a strongly stable matching. Then
(m, wi ) ∈ M for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ r).
(ii) If woman w is deleted from man m’s list during Algorithm SMTI-ML-Strong then (m, w) cannot be a pair in
any strongly stable matching.
(iii) If man m has an empty set of key women then m cannot be matched in any strongly stable matching.
Proof. (i) Suppose that M is a strongly stable matching in which m is not matched to any of his key women, and that
every man preceding m in the master list is matched to a key woman x in every strongly stable matching. Note that
this assumption also implies that all of these women x are matched in M to a man for whom they are a key woman
(since there are exactly the right number of them). Then at least one of m’s key women, say wi , is not matched in M
to any of the men tied with m in the master list, since the number of such men must be equal to the size of the union
of their sets of key women. We claim that (m, wi ) must be a blocking pair for M . First of all, m cannot have a partner
in M whom he prefers to wi ; the fact that wi is a key woman for m means that any preferred woman y must have been
deleted from m’s list before the master list tie containing m was processed during the algorithm’s execution, hence y
is a key woman for some strict predecessor(s) of m in the master list, and by our assumption y must be matched to
such a predecessor in M . Nor, by our assumption, can m have a partner tied withwi in his preference list — so m must
strictly prefer wi to his partner in M (or is unmatched in M). Also, wi cannot have a partner in M whom she prefers to
m, for, again by our assumption, any such man p is matched in M to a key woman z; moreover z 6= wi for otherwise
wi would have been deleted from m’s list before the master list tie containing m was processed, a contradiction.
This establishes the claim, so there can be no strongly stable matching in which m is not matched to one of his key
women.
(ii) Suppose that w is deleted from man m’s list during Algorithm SMTI-ML-Strong. Then w must be a key
woman for some other man p, and by part (i), and the fact that there are just enough key women to be matched with
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the tied men at each stage, she must be matched to p, or some man tied with p in the master list, in any strongly
stable matching. As m is a successor of p on the master list, it follows that (m, w) cannot belong to a strongly stable
matching.
(iii) Manm has an empty set of key women only if all women have been deleted from his list, so that the conclusion
follows immediately from part (ii). 
Theorem 6.4. (a) If Algorithm SMTI-ML-Strong returns a matching M then M is a strongly stable matching for the
given instance of SMTI-1ML.
(b) If Algorithm SMTI-ML-Strong returns null then there is no strongly stable matching for the given instance of
SMTI-1ML.
(c) Every strongly stable matching is returned by some execution of the algorithm with appropriate choice of SDR
at each stage.
Proof. (a) Suppose that the algorithm returns matching M , and that the pair (m, w) is a blocking pair of M as a
strongly stable matching. Suppose first that m is unmatched in M . Then at the point where the algorithm processes the
master list tie T containing m, m’s preference list must be empty. So w must have been removed from m’s list when
some earlier tie was processed, and as a consequence w must prefer M(w) to m, a contradiction. Next suppose that m
prefers w to M(m). As in the previous case, w must have been removed from m’s list when some earlier tie was being
processed, so that w prefers M(w) to m. Finally, if w and M(m) appear in the same tie on m’s list then either the
previous case applies again, or w and M(m) are both key women for m. In this latter case, the algorithm will match
w to some other man in tie T , so that (m, w) does not, after all, form a blocking pair.
(b) For a tie T in the master list, let S = {m1, . . . ,mk} be the set of men in T with a non-empty list when T is
processed, and let Wi be the set of key women for mi (1 ≤ i ≤ k). Suppose that |⋃Wi | < k or that W1, . . . ,Wk do
not have an SDR. Then, in a would-be strongly stable matching M , some man m in S is not matched to a key woman,
which is a contradiction to Lemma 6.3(i).
Now suppose that |⋃Wi | > k. Then if M is a strongly stable matching, there is some woman w who is a key
woman for a man m in S, but who is not matched in M to a man in S. She cannot be matched to a man in T \ S since,
by Lemma 6.3(iii) such men are unmatched in M . And nor can she be matched to a man that precedes T in the master
list, since she cannot be a key woman for any such man. So w prefers m to her partner in M , or is unmatched in M .
Since, by Lemma 6.3(i), m must be matched in M to a key woman, and therefore does not prefer w to his partner in
M , the pair (m, w) is a blocking pair of M .
(c) Let M be a strongly stable matching for the given instance. As observed earlier, M must consist of a set of
pairs (m, w) where w is a key woman for m, and every man who has a key woman is matched with one of them. It is
immediate that any such matching can be generated by an application of the algorithm. 
The complexity of algorithm SMTI-ML-Strong is dominated by the need to check for the existence of a system of
distinct representatives. If the ties T1, . . . Tk in the master list are of lengths t1, . . . , tk , then all the checks for an SDR
using the perfect matching algorithm of Hopcroft and Karp [9] can be achieved in O(Σ
√
timi ) time, where mi is the
number of (man, woman) pairs (m, w) such that m belongs to Ti and w is a key woman for m. Here Σ ti = n and
Σmi ≤ a. Hence the overall complexity of the algorithm is O(√na), which contrasts with the best known bound for
a strongly stable matching in a general instance of SMTI, namely O(na) [18].
7. Summary and conclusion
In this paper we have presented a range of algorithmic results for variants of SM where individual preference
lists may be derived from master lists of the men and/or women. Many of our results refer to the weak stability
criterion — these results are summarised in Table 1. The table rows labelled ‘Maximum’, ‘Min regret’, ‘Egalitarian’
and ‘Lexicographic’ refer to the problems of finding a maximum, minimum regret, egalitarian and lexicographic
maximum weakly stable matching, given an instance of the problem specified in each column. The table row labelled
‘Stable pair’ refers to the problem of deciding whether a given (man, woman) pair is weakly stable, given an instance
of the problem specified in each column. In the body of the table, ‘P’ denotes polynomial-time solvable, whilst ‘N’
denotes NP-hard. Entries corresponding to ‘Min Regret’, ‘Egalitarian’ and ‘Lexicographic’ in SMTI-2ML are not
given, since these problems are not well-defined for SMTI (in view of the fact that weakly stable matchings can have
different sizes).
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Table 1
Summary of results for master list problems involving weak stability
SMI-1ML SMTI-2ML SMT-2ML SMT-1ML
Maximum P N P P
Stable pair P N P N
Min regret P – P N
Egalitarian P – P N
Lexicographic P – P N
Many of the results presented in this paper first appeared in Chapter 8 of [26], to which we refer the interested
reader for more details concerning the algorithmic complexity of variants of SMTI involving master lists.
As described in Section 1, stable matching problems with master lists arise in large-scale applications such as
the assignment of junior doctors to hospitals. The NP-hardness and inapproximability results presented in this paper
for variants of SMT under weak stability involving master lists clearly carry over to the corresponding variants of
HRT. Furthermore, the algorithms for SMTI-1ML under strong stability and super-stability have been extended to the
HRT-1ML case [23].
Also, in many practical applications, the preference lists of at least one side tend to be short. If we combine this
constraint with the presence of one or two master lists, then we are led to instances of SMTI and its variants where the
individual preference lists on a given side are both of bounded length and derived from a given master list. Theorem 3.3
shows that MAX SMTI-2 ML is NP-hard, even if the length of each man’s individual list is at most L1 and that of each
woman’s individual list is at most L2, where L1 = 4 and L2 = 3. This leaves open the complexity of the problem
when L1 < 4 and/or L2 < 3.
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